Non-OPEC liquids supply will continue its post-pandemic rebound. It is projected to grow from 63.6 mb/d in 2021 to 71.4 mb/d in 2027, under the assumption of a strong demand recovery and on the back of supportive fundamentals. The United States (US) will remain the leading source of medium-term non-OPEC liquids supply growth, providing 3.9 mb/d, or 50% of incremental output. Other major medium-term sources of non-OPEC supply growth are Brazil (+1.2 mb/d), Guyana (+0.8 mb/d), Canada (+0.5 mb/d) and Norway (+0.4 mb/d). By contrast, geopolitical tensions related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, are set to result in Russian liquids supply declining by 0.7 mb/d in the medium-term.
In the long-term, total non-OPEC liquids supply declines again from the early 2030s, to average 67.5 mb/d in 2045, albeit still up by 3.9 mb/d from 2021. Resource constraints see US tight oil peak at just over 16 mb/d around 2030. Thereafter, supply growth continues in Guyana, Canada, Kazakhstan, Brazil and Qatar, but is insufficient to offset non-OPEC declines elsewhere.
Non-crude liquids supply growth offsets crude oil’s longer-term decline. Besides natural gas liquids (NGLs), biofuels and other liquids, including Canadian oil sands, and progressively, synthetic aviation fuel (SAF), are also important sources of new barrels. These are increasingly supported by energy policies, mandates and technology advances.
OPEC liquids are projected to expand from 31.6 mb/d in 2021 to around 36 mb/d in 2022 and hold steady around this level throughout the medium-term. After non-OPEC supply peaks around 2030, OPEC liquids are set to increase again, rising to 42.4 mb/d by 2045. Thus, OPEC’s share of global liquids supply is projected to increase from 33% in 2021 to 39% in 2045.
Global challenge to meet oil-related investment requirements of $12.1 trillion by 2045
Cumulative oil-related investment requirements are projected at $12.1 trillion over the entire 2022–2045 period (in 2022 US dollars). This is slightly higher than assessed in the World Oil Outlook (WOO) 2021, as upward-revised demand projections and assumed cost inflation in the short- and medium-term more than offset the forecast period being one year shorter. Upstream needs make up $9.5 trillion, while downstream and midstream requirements are $1.6 and $1 trillion, respectively.
Cumulativeoil-related investment requirements are projected at $12.1 trillion over the entire2022–2045 period (in 2022 US dollars). This is slightly higher than assessed inthe World Oil Outlook (WOO) 2021, as upward-revised demand projections andassumed cost inflation in the short- and medium-term more than offset theforecast period being one year shorter. Upstream needs make up $9.5 trillion,while downstream and midstream requirements are $1.6 and $1 trillion,respectively.
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
* Latin America other includes Bolivia, Cuba, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago and smaller producers, but excludes OPEC Member Venezuela
Source: OPEC
* Africa other includes Cameroon, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda and smaller producers, but excludes African OPEC producers
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: GE/Baker Hughes, EIA
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
Source: OPEC
2021 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | Change 2021-2045 | |
Americas | 25.2 | 29.0 | 29.2 | 27.9 | 26.5 | 25.2 | 0.0 |
of which US | 17.8 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 19.9 | 18.5 | 17.2 | -0.5 |
Europe | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 0.3 |
Asia Pacific | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | -0.1 |
Total OECD | 29.4 | 33.6 | 34.0 | 32.5 | 31.0 | 29.7 | 0.3 |
China | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.2 | -0.2 |
India | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
Other Asia | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.8 | -0.6 |
Latin America | 6.0 | 7.3 | 8.8 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.7 | 2.8 |
Middle East | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 0.5 |
Africa | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.2 |
Russia | 10.8 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 10.4 | -0.4 |
Other Eurasia | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 0.3 |
Other Europe | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
Total Non-OECD | 31.9 | 33.4 | 35.6 | 35.8 | 35.3 | 34.6 | 2.8 |
Total Non-OPEC production | 61.3 | 67.0 | 69.6 | 68.3 | 66.3 | 64.3 | 3.0 |
Processing gains | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 0.9 |
Total Non-OPEC liquids | 63.6 | 69.6 | 72.4 | 71.2 | 69.3 | 67.5 | 3.9 |
OPEC liquids | 31.6 | 36.1 | 36.1 | 38.3 | 40.4 | 42.4 | 10.7 |
World | 95.2 | 105.7 | 108.4 | 109.5 | 109.8 | 109.8 | 14.6 |
2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | Change 2021-2027 | |
Americas | 25.2 | 26.7 | 27.8 | 28.5 | 29.0 | 29.3 | 29.4 | 4.3 |
of which US | 17.8 | 19.0 | 20.1 | 20.8 | 21.3 | 21.6 | 21.7 | 3.9 |
Europe | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 0.4 |
Asia Pacific | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.1 |
Total OECD | 29.4 | 31.0 | 32.4 | 33.1 | 33.6 | 34.0 | 34.2 | 4.8 |
China | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 0.3 |
India | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
Other Asia | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | -0.2 |
Latin America | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 2.2 |
Middle East | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 0.5 |
Africa | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 0.4 |
Russia | 10.8 | 10.6 | 10.4 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 10.1 | -0.7 |
Other Eurasia | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 0.2 |
Other Europe | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
Total Non-OECD | 31.9 | 32.3 | 32.6 | 32.9 | 33.4 | 33.9 | 34.6 | 2.7 |
Total Non-OPEC production | 61.3 | 63.3 | 65.0 | 66.0 | 67.0 | 67.9 | 68.8 | 7.5 |
Processing gains | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 0.4 |
Total Non-OPEC liquids | 63.6 | 65.7 | 67.4 | 68.5 | 69.6 | 70.5 | 71.4 | 7.8 |
OPEC liquids | 31.6 | 36.0 | 36.3 | 36.3 | 36.1 | 35.9 | 35.6 | 4.0 |
World | 95.2 | 101.7 | 103.8 | 104.8 | 105.7 | 106.5 | 107.1 | 11.9 |
2021 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | Change 2021-2045 | |
US tight oil | 11.6 | 15.5 | 16.1 | 15.2 | 14.2 | 13.1 | 1.6 |
of which: tight crude | 7.3 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 9.2 | 8.1 | 6.9 | -0.4 |
of which: unconventional NGLs | 4.3 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 2.0 |
US Gulf of Mexico crude | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | -0.3 |
US Alaska crude | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | -0.3 |
US other crude | 1.8 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 | -1.4 |
US other NGLs | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | -0.5 |
US biofuels | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 0.3 |
US other liquids | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
Memo item: US total crude | 11.2 | 13.7 | 13.4 | 11.8 | 10.3 | 8.9 | -2.3 |
Memo item: US total NGLs | 5.4 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 1.5 |
Total US liquids production | 17.8 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 19.9 | 18.5 | 17.2 | -0.5 |
2021 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | Change 2021-2045 | |
Crude | 43.3 | 46.9 | 48.0 | 45.5 | 42.6 | 40.0 | -3.3 |
NGLs | 11.6 | 13.0 | 13.7 | 14.1 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 2.7 |
Global biofuels | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 1.9 |
Other liquids | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 1.6 |
Processing gains | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 0.9 |
Total Non-OPEC | 63.6 | 69.6 | 72.4 | 71.2 | 69.3 | 67.5 | 3.9 |
2021 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | Change 2021-2045 | |
Fuel ethanol | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 0.9 |
Biodiesel | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.0 |
Global biofuels | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 1.9 |
Canadian oil sands | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 1.2 |
Gas-to-liquids (GTL) | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
Coal-to-liquids (CTL) | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
Synthetic aviation fuel ('SAF') | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
Other* | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
Total 'Other liquids' | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 1.6 |
Non-OPEC | 6.5 | 7.1 | 8.0 | 8.7 | 9.5 | 10.0 | 3.6 |